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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the short-term price reactions after one-day abnormal price changes on the 
Ukrainian stock market. The original method of abnormal returns calculation is examined. We find 
significant evidence of overreactions using the daily data over the period 2008-2012. Our analysis 
confirms the hypothesis that after an abnormal price movement the size of contrarian price movement 
is usually higher then after normal (typical) daily fluctuation. Comparing Ukrainian data with the 
figures from US stock market it is concluded that the Ukrainian stock market is less efficient which 
gives rise to opportunities for extra profits obtained from trading based on contrarian strategies. Based 
on results of the research we also recommend some rules of trading on short-term market 
overreactions. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The hypothesis that provided an analytical framework 
for understanding asset prices and their behavior is the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 1965and 
Beechey et al. 2000). According to Jensen (1978) 
there is no other proposition in economics which has 
more solid empirical evidence supporting it.  
EMH points to the fact that all participants of 
financial markets are rational economic subjects and 
have equal access to information. As the result it is 
impossible to get additional profits, since all important 
information is already included in price (Fama, 1965). 
This means that it is impossible to identify 
undervalued assets and/or overvalued assets. Price of 
the asset does not depend on its price in the previous 
periods. That is why, according to EMH, the study of 
past price changes of the asset does not indicate the 
future direction of price movements.  
However, a number of recent studies furnish 
evidence in favor of a certain level of predictability in 
price movements. As examples that can be mentioned 
are well known market anomalies: firm anomalies 
(size, closed-end mutual funds, neglect, institutional 
holdings etc), seasonal anomalies (January, weekend, 
time of day. end of month, seasonal, holidays etc.), 
accounting anomalies (Price/Earnings ratio, earnings 
surprises, dividend yield, earnings momentum etc.) 
and event anomalies (analysts' recommendations, 
insider trading. listings etc) (Levy, 2002).  
Another important example of market 
inefficiency is market overreactions. Market 
overreactions were identified by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) who showed that investors overvalue the recent 
information and undervalue past information. The 
result of this is the following anomaly: Portfolios with 
the worst (best) dynamics during a three-year period 
prefer to show the best (worst) results over the next 
three years, the so-called overreaction hypothesis. 
A special case of the overreaction hypothesis is 
short-term price reactions after one-day abnormal 
price changes. There is empirical evidence from 
different financial markets that after one-day abnormal 
price changes the size of contrarian price movement is 
higher than after normal (typical) daily fluctuations 
(Atkins and Dyl, 1990, Bremer and Sweeney, 1991, 
1996, Cox and Peterson, 1994, and Choi, H.-S. and 
Jayaraman, N. 2009).  
Despite a considerable amount of research 
already conducted on the overreaction theory, there 
are still a number of unsolved areas. For example, 
usually a single stock market is normally the only 
object of research. In our opinion it is important to 
research the overreaction hypothesis on different types 
of financial markets. In addition, the Ukrainian stock 
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market has never been the subject of overreaction 
hypothesis testing. 
This paper aims to expand the overreaction 
knowledge by examining the existence of such 
anomaly in Ukrainian stock market and testing the 
overreaction hypothesis on different financial markets. 
The purpose of this study is therefore to confirm 
/reject the presence of abnormal counter-reactions 
after one-day abnormal price changes on different 
financial markets. 
To confirm/reject the fact that the size of 
counter-reaction that occur after abnormal price 
fluctuations differs from the size of typical 
countermovement (countermovement after usual, 
standard day, without any overreactions) we use t-
statistics. The excess of calculated t-test values over 
its critical value indicates that the presented data sets 
belong to different general populations. This, in turn, 
confirms the overreaction hypothesis.  
We analyze data not only from Ukrainian stock 
market, but also from the US stock market (Dow 
Jones Index), FOREX (EURUSD) and commodity 
markets (gold, oil). This allows, on the basis of 
common methodology, to test overreaction theory on 
different types of markets. This approach also gives a 
possibility to compare results from different financial 
markets. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows: A review of the existing literature on 
overreaction hypothesis and reasons for overreactions. 
A section that provides the methodology followed in 
the study. Next follows a section that presents the 
results and key findings of the study. Last there a 
section on the conclusions and summary of the paper.  
 
2 Literature review 
 
Despite some contradictory of EMH hypothesis (for 
example, asset prices have fundamental basis, 
existence of market anomalies), the law of random 
walk is confirmed both on practical and theoretical 
levels. To demonstrate this we have simulated the 
price dynamics (Figure 1) using the random generator 
of price changes with 50% chance. In Fig. 2, we 
present a fragment of graph, illustrated changes in 
prices of gold (day interval). 
 
 
Figure 1. Graph of randomly generated values (probability 0.5) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Fragment of gold prices chart (day interval) 
 
 
Source: Archive of quotations MetaQuotes 
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Kothari and Warner (2006) conducted a study of 
scientific publications in favor of EMH. According to 
their results, there are more than 500 publications in 
top economic journals to testify in favor of the rational 
behavior of investors and their adequate and efficient 
response to new information. Nevertheless, empirical 
data from financial markets show that assumptions 
underlying the EMH do not always correspond to 
reality. The same applies to the main provisions of the 
efficient market hypothesis. 
Discrepancies between the real life and EMH are 
observed in practice and in theory. Ball R. (2009) 
notes that the list of EMH inconsistencies is quite long 
and includes both market over- and under-reactions to 
certain information, volatility explosions and seasonal 
yield bursts, yield dependence on different variables 
such as market capitalization, dividend rate, and 
market factors. 
 
2.1 Overreaction 
 
Researchers pay much attention to the overreactions in 
the financial markets - significant deviations in price 
changes on assets from their average (typical) values 
during certain period of time. In Fig. 1 and 2 we 
showed graphs of randomly generated values and 
dynamics of real prices and concluded that they are 
quite similar. There are however situations in the 
market which cannot be simulated by random 
generation. For example, random generation will fail 
to display the picture, which took place in 2008-2010 
in the U.S. stock market (Fig. 3). This is a typical case 
of overreaction. 
 
Figure 3. Dynamics of Dow Jones Industrial Average Index during 2000-2013 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 describes an example of a long-term 
market overreaction. It is however also true that 
overreactions may occur on shorter time intervals.   
There are two hypotheses to explain the 
abnormal price movements: 
 Overreaction Hypothesis - according to this 
hypothesis, investors overreact in a given period, but 
the next period they act in opposite direction, i.e. if the 
price has increased one day, then the next day it will 
fall and vice versa; 
 Under-reaction Hypothesis - investors 
underreact at event during the period of its 
appearance, however the next period they adjust 
actions - which means in case of some positive news 
price may not respond or even decrease, however the 
next day it will increase (Stefanescu et al. (2012)). 
The overreaction hypothesis was first identified 
by De Bondt and Thaler (1985). De Bondt-Thaler’s 
(DT) idea was based on Kahneman-Tversky’s (1982) 
research who showed that investors overvalue the 
recent information and undervalue the past 
information. 
The main conclusions of DT’s research were that 
portfolios with the worst/best dynamics during three-
year period prefer to show the best/worst results over 
the next three years. Such results were obtained by 
analyzing the investment portfolios on the New York 
Stock Exchange.  
According to DT, profits can be obtained using 
the following trading strategy of buy assets that have 
lost in value and selling those that have grown in 
value. Defining parameters of this trading strategy, DT 
got the following results:  
 Portfolios with results, worse than average 
during previous 3 years, showed a return over the next 
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36 months that exceeded the average market average 
on 19.6%.  
 Portfolios with profits over-average during next 
36 months, earn 5% less than the average market rate 
of return. [6] 
Overreactions are associated with irrational 
behavior of investors who overreact on certain news, 
perceiving them too optimistic (pessimistic). This 
leads to significant deviations in prices of the asset 
from its fundamental value (price). Such overreaction 
leads to correction of prices in subsequent periods. 
Interesting fact, mentioned by DT, is asymmetry 
of overreaction. The size of overreaction is bigger for 
undervalued stocks than for overvalued stocks. 
Another result of the DT’s work is confirmation of the 
"January effect" - overreactions occur mostly in 
January. 
After DT’s (1985) publication, scientists from 
different countries conducted similar studies in terms 
of different time periods, markets and countries. Here 
are some examples of such researches. 
 Brown-Harlow (1988) analyzed New York 
Stock Exchange data for the period from 1946 to 1983 
and reached similar to DT conclusions. 
 Zarowin (1989) showed the presence of short-
term market overreactions. 
 Atkins and Dyl (1990) investigated the 
behavior of common shares on the New York Stock 
Exchange after significant price changes in one 
trading day and found overreaction presence, 
especially in the case of falling prices. 
 Ferri and C. Min (1996) confirmed the 
overreaction hypothesis on S&P 500 data for the 
period 1962-1991. 
 Larson and Madura (2003) analyzed New York 
Stock Exchange data for the period from 1988 to 1998 
and showed the presence of overreaction effect. 
 Clements et al. (2007) also testified in favor of 
the overreaction hypothesis. Analysis of data during 
1983-2007 showed that manifestations of overreaction 
effect become even more obvious nowadays. 
Overreaction hypothesis was confirmed in 
different international stock markets, including Spain 
(Alonso and Rubio (1990)), Canada (Kryzanowsky 
and Zhang (1992)), Australian (Brailsford (1992)), 
(Clare and Thomas (1995)), Japanese (Chang et al. 
(1995)), Hong-Kong (Akhigbe et al. 1998)), Brazilian 
(DaCosta and Newton (1994), Richards (1997)), New 
Zealand (Bowman and Iverson (1998)), Chinese 
(Wang et al. (2004)), Greek (Anthoniou et. al., 2005), 
Turkish (Gülin Vardar & Berna Okan, 2008) and 
Taiwan (Lin (1988)). 
Most of the researchers, as a research object, use 
stock markets (see the example above), however 
overreaction hypothesis was tested in other markets. 
In particular, the gold market (Cutler, Poterba, and 
Summers (1991)), option market (Poteshman (2001)). 
The efficiency of the overreaction hypothesis 
was proved not only on theoretical and empirical 
level, but also in the sphere of real trading. For 
example, Jegadeesh (1993) developed a trading 
strategy based on the main provisions of the 
overreaction hypothesis. Strategy algorithm is quite 
simple and consists in opening transactions in 
direction, opposite to the previous movement. As the 
period of analysis Jegadeesh used month. So, after 
price on certain asset within a month increases, it 
should be sold and short position is held during the 
month.  
Contrary actions are performed in case of price 
decreasing. Profitability of such strategy according to 
Jegadeesh is 2% per month. A similar strategy but 
with a period of a week, was developed by Lehmann 
(1990). The result was 2% return in a week. Such 
results indirectly evidence that overreaction 
hypothesis is not just a hypothetical construction, but 
is actually working and effective.  
 
2.2 Reasons for overreactions 
 
Despite a large number of scientific researches 
devoted to the problem of overreactions, there is no 
consensus about its causes. According to EMH, 
overreactions should not exist because they create 
opportunities to obtain extra profits.  
However, current evidence is in favor of the 
overreaction hypothesis. Summarizing existing 
theories we can list the reasons for these overreactions 
as Psychological, Technical, Fundamental and other.  
 
2.3 Psychological overreactions 
 
Psychological overreactions are normally associated 
with the following: 
 Overreaction to new information - Instead of 
comparing new information with existing information 
and taking rational decisions, investors act under 
emotions and the herd effect. (Griffin and Tversky 
(1992), Madura and Richie (2004)). 
 Existence of "noise" traders - Irrational 
investors take investment decisions on fragmentary 
information and current price fluctuations. According 
to Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), one of the most 
common behavioral signs of noise traders is their 
attempt to sell, if current prices fall and buy if prices 
increase. Thus, their activity increases the price 
fluctuations in the markets.  
Developing the idea of presence in the market 
different investors, Hong and Stein (1999) note the 
existence of two types of investors: those ones who 
trade on inside and private information 
("newswatchers", investors who use fundamental 
analysis are the basis for investment decisions), the 
other ones take decisions based on past prices analysis 
and extrapolation its results on the future ("momentum 
traders", investors who use technical analysis as a base 
for decision-making).  
Depending on dominating type of investor in the 
market, overreaction or under-reaction may occur. For 
example, technical analysts react to price fluctuations 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, 2013, Continued - 4 
 
410 
very quickly, that leads to the overreactions, if they 
dominate in the market. Conversely, investors who use 
fundamental analysis are oriented over a longer time 
horizons. They respond to new information slowly. 
This can lead to under-reaction of the market for 
particular new information. 
 The representativeness effect – If a particular 
market or market sector is growing rapidly for some 
time, it forms a positive image among investors. 
Accordingly, investors begin to prefer assets of this 
sector. In turn it leads to increase in demand and 
therefore price growth. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998) explain representativeness effect by the fact 
that investors often ignore the laws of chance and 
behave as if the events, that took place recently, are 
typical. However, they are very slow to change their 
previous views and beliefs in response to the 
emergence of new information. 
 Psychological characteristics of investor’s 
behavior, such as panic and the effect of the crowd - 
Typical human psychological flaws can explain why 
"rational" investors buy assets higher than their 
fundamental value and sell below their fair value. 
 Overconfidence and biased attitude - Investors 
often overestimate their ability to analyze the market 
situation. In this regard, they underestimated the 
likelihood of errors in the prediction of a certain event. 
Usually it is associated with a certain experience 
which caused the illusion of market understanding.  
Daniel et al. (1998) also names a biased attitude 
as a psychological feature. If some information 
confirms the predictions of investor, it strengthens his 
belief in own rightness. In addition, the investor’s 
confidence decreases very slowly even if information 
begins to refute their predictions. In other words, there 
is a tendency to consider random success as own 
achievement and to think that mistakes are caused 
totally by the external factors, independent from 
investor. 
 
2.4 Technical reasons 
 
An important group of factors that can lead to the 
emergence of market overreactions are technical 
reasons, i.e. factors associated with the use of 
technical analysis by investors in making decisions. 
Technical analysis methodology is based on the 
previous price fluctuations in forecasts of future 
prices. It is widely believed that the current movement 
in the price of assets can generate specific trading 
signals from various technical indicators that will lead 
to massive operations/trading in the current movement 
direction and will strengthen it causing overreaction. 
Another important technical factor is price 
behavior when it approaches "level" (term from 
technical analysis that characterizes certain price 
values which act as some sort of a barrier to the next 
movement, since interest of the market is generally 
concentrated in these price zones). “Level” 
breakthrough usually leads to massive operations in 
direction of current price movement.  
One of the most important technical factors 
leading to overreactions is the execution of so-called 
"stop-losses" (“stops”). These are orders to close open 
positions when a certain level of losses is achieved 
(see Duran and Caginalp (2007)). Execution of stops 
means opening positions in the direction of current 
movement (forced closure of the short positions means 
opening of the long positions and vice versa). Stops 
execution acts as a movement catalyst or accelerator, 
and leads to increase in the scale of basic movement 
and loss of control over its size. The most typical 
example of overreaction caused by stops execution is 
the collapse of U.S. stock indexes in 1987 (Black 
Monday), when Dow Jones index lost 22.6%. 
Analyzing the role of technical factors, Aiyagari-
Gertler (1999) proposed an explanation for the 
emergence of overreactions called the margin-call 
theory. Its meaning is very close to previously 
analyzed stops execution. The bottom line of their idea 
is: to open a position on particular asset investors need 
cash collateral - margin. To increase clients' 
operations, increase their trading opportunities, 
brokers usually provide traders with the so-called 
leverage (some sort of a loan).  
For example, with a $ 10,000 account trader can 
open positions on hundreds of thousands dollars. 
When position is opened certain amount of margin is 
needed and is reserved on the trade account. The 
consequence of this practice is an opportunity to make 
bigger profits, but bigger risks and losses too. At the 
same time, brokers, do not want to risk their own 
money (acting as a creditor of client’s operations they 
share risks). So they limit the risks of the client using 
the margin-call mechanism.  
Positions are closed when margin requirements 
reach certain level of equity (when trade account is 
insufficient to cover existing losses plus a certain level 
of margin). In case of large and unexpected movement 
in the markets margin-call mechanism often comes 
into action, closing the most unprofitable position of 
the client to release the margin. Closure of 
unprofitable positions means, that opposite positions 
are opened, i.e. positions in the direction of current 
movement, thus increasing its scale. 
Margin-call theory has the right to life, especially 
in case of super-movements (as in 1929 or 1987 
years), though there are doubts that in the case of 
"normal" overreactions this factor can be dominant. 
 
2.5 Fundamental reasons 
 
One more important group of factors is the 
fundamental ones such as the so-called "price-ratio 
hypothesis", proposed by Dreman (1982). According 
to this hypothesis, companies with low P/E ratio are 
undervalued. However, usually there are few investors 
who wish to buy stocks of these companies. It happens 
because past negative still strong in the memory of 
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investors. Nevertheless, when negative news on such 
companies end and positive news become dominant, 
the demand for shares increases dramatically. That 
leads to abnormal movements. Opposite situation is 
observed for overvalued shares. 
 
2.6 Other reasons 
 
Other reasons include the lack of liquidity in the 
market. Even small numbers and amounts of 
transactions can lead to significant price fluctuations 
(Jegadeesh-Titman (1992)). 
Based on the analysis of the causes of market 
overreactions, the question arises that if an 
overreaction is not the result of achieving a new level 
of fair price, but rather a combination of 
psychological, technical and other non-rational 
factors, in this case at the end of overreaction, should 
prices correct to adjust equilibrium level? If it is so, 
the result should be that the size of countermovement 
in prices should exceed the size of countermovement 
for standard (normal, usual) periods. 
Bremer and Sweeney (1991) proved the fact that 
after a very strong negative price movement positive 
price movement occurs. Their size exceeds ordinary 
movements. Analysis of negative daily changes which 
in size exceeded 10% showed that the next day price 
increased on average by 1.77%. 
This phenomenon can be explained by:  
 Fixation of profits - traders who open positions 
in the direction of the abnormal movement on the next 
day (realizing the fact that the potential of the 
movement is exhausted), close their positions to fix 
profits. To do this they have to open opposite 
positions and that initiates the movement in the 
opposite direction to the previous abnormal movement 
direction; 
 Technical factors - after abnormally strong 
movements some technical indicators (especially 
oscillators) generate signals for transactions in a 
direction opposite to the previous abnormal 
movement; 
 Market (rational) factors - investors reassess 
information and understand the fact of the previous 
movement abnormality, with further actions to return 
to its equilibrium level. 
 
 
3 Research methodology 
 
In this paper t-statistics is used to confirm/reject the 
fact that the size of counter-reaction that occurs after 
abnormal price fluctuations differs from the size of 
typical counter-movements (countermovement after 
usual, standard day, without any overreactions). The 
excess of the calculated t-test values over its critical 
value will indicate that presented data sets belong to 
different general populations. In practical terms this 
will mean that the size of countermovement that 
occurs after abnormal movements statistically differs 
from the normal countermovement. This, in turn, 
confirms the overreaction theory.  
One of the conditions for the use of the t-test is 
the normality of the distribution of the analyzed data. 
Note that our sample is quite large in size (from a few 
hundreds to several thousands values). This allows us 
to use the central limit theorem and concludes 
compliance data to normal distribution (for details see 
Mendenhall et al. (2003)).  
However, in order to confirm above-mentioned 
logical assumptions, we will analyze the "normality" 
of our data using specially designed criterion. 
Normal distribution, so-called Gaussian 
distribution, is the probability distribution, under 
which the resulting value is affected by a large number 
of random factors. 
Central Limit Theorem: If a random variable is 
exposed to an infinite number of infinitely small 
random factors, it is normally distributed. 
Random variable is a variable which value 
results from the measurement of a quantity that is 
subject to variations due to chance (i.e. randomness, in 
a mathematical sense). 
There are many factors that affect the movement 
of market prices and their influence is very different. 
So the price movement assumes the character of 
random fluctuations (usually for a limited period of 
time). Thus, financial assets prices can be regarded as 
random variables. 
In order to check data, we used the Pearson 
criterion. We randomly selected 100 consecutive 
ranges of prices for the period 2006-2008 (Table 1) 
and calculated values of test statistics. If test statistics 
does not exceed the critical value of chi-square 
distribution, the value is normally distributed. 
 
Table 1. “Normality” of EUR/USD data 
 
 2006 2007 2008 
Number of values 100 
Average 80.14 73.62 145.19 
Standard deviation 28.37 24.5 51.67 
Confidence probability 0.95 
Test statistics 6.1 9.37 9.12 
Chi-square distribution (hi(p=0.95, f=7) ) 14.1 
Conclusion Data is  normally distributed 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, 2013, Continued - 4 
 
412 
Thus, daily ranges of financial assets prices 
changes are normally distributed. So the data is 
relevant to use Student's t-test. 
The next important thing is data sample 
formation. The principal moment here is the 
interpretation of overreaction.  
We will analyze short-term overreactions, so the 
period of analysis will be 1 day (one trading session). 
Typical price parameters that characterize the 
behavior of prices during one day are: maximum 
price, minimum price, open and close price. 
In most studies to measure the size of price 
movement the difference between the open and close 
price is used. This is the final size of price changes 
over one day - daily return. 
However, we believe this approach is not 
adequate enough and does not reflect real events fully. 
There are a lot of overreactions (when price during 
one day deviates strongly) with small price between 
open and close prices. So, we propose to consider 
daily return as the size of the fluctuations in price 
during the day, i.e. the difference between the 
maximum and minimum prices during the day. 
It should be noted that in most cases, to calculate 
the size of overreaction and daily return relative 
values are used. An alternative to this approach is 
calculation of the movement size in absolute values. 
Anyway, as the use of relative values let us avoid 
the impact of changes in absolute size of daily ranges 
due to the price changes (for example, when prices 
grow the absolute size of fluctuations also increases) 
we consider relative values more correct and adequate. 
So the formula for calculating the daily return 
will be: 
 
%100
)(



i
ii
i
Low
LowHigh
R         (1) 
 
where   iR  - daily return % for day і; 
iHigh  - maximum price for day і; 
iLow  - minimum price for day і. 
 
The next important step is to define the criteria 
for overreaction. Which daily return is normal, and 
which is abnormal (overreaction period)? We offer 3 
variants for the overreactions defined. 
1) If current daily return exceeds the average 
plus one standard deviation then this day is concerned 
to be a day of overreaction 
 
)( nni RR   
(2) 
 
where nR  - average size of daily returns for period n. 
nRR
n
i
in /
1



      
                  (3) 
n  - standard deviation of daily returns for 
period n 
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i
in RR
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2) if current daily return exceeds the average plus 
two standard deviations then this day is concerned to 
be a day of overreaction 
 
)2( nni RR                     (5) 
 
3) if current daily return exceeds the average plus 
three standard deviations then this day is concerned to 
be a day of overreaction 
 
)3( nni RR       (6) 
 
Period of averaging will be determined during 
the data analysis. 
Thus, if the size of daily return of the test period 
exceeds the given parameters, it is considered 
abnormal. Accordingly this day is the day of 
overreaction and the next day should be the day of 
abnormal counter-reaction (at least this hypothesis 
will be checked). 
The next step is to determine the size of 
counterreaction. We suggest determining it as the 
relative difference between the open price the next day 
and the maximum deviation from it in the direction 
opposite to the price movement on the overreaction 
day. 
If price increased, during the overreaction, then 
the formula for counterreaction size calculation is: 
 
1
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1
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where 
1icR  - counterreaction size 
1iOpen  - open price of the day next to day of. 
 
If price decreased, during the overreaction, then 
the formula for counterreaction size calculation is: 
 
1
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1
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OpenHigh
сR        (8) 
 
The result of calculations will be formation of 
two data sets: 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, 2013, Continued - 4 
 
413 
Set 1. Size of counterreactions after normal price 
fluctuations 
Set 2. Size of counterreactions after abnormal 
price fluctuations 
The aim of research is to test these two data sets 
for their conformity to the same general population. If 
they match, overreactions hypothesis is not confirmed. 
Otherwise, if these arrays belong to various general 
populations, the overreaction hypothesis is confirmed 
and the fact that abnormal price movements generate 
abnormal countermovement is also proved. Checking 
for compliance will be done using Student’s t-test. 
The null hypothesis in this case is: two sets 
belong to the same general population. If t-critical 
exceeds t-calculated, the null hypothesis is accepted 
otherwise – it is rejected (that means that data sets 
belong to different general populations). 
The algorithm of our methodology is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 4. The algorithm of our methodology 
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4 Findings 
 
As objects of analysis we choose the following 
financial assets: 
 Dow-Jones index (developed stock market); 
 Currency pair EURUSD (FOREX); 
 Gold (commodities); 
 Oil (commodities); 
 UX index (leading Ukrainian stock market 
index - emerging stock market). 
Test results for these assets are presented in 
Appendices 1-5. Results are rather sensitive to the 
parameters of testing (period of averaging and 
criterion of normality – the number of standard 
deviations that should be added to the mean). That is 
why they are mixed.  
Interesting result of analysis is conclusion that 
increased size of abnormal movement does not 
necessary lead to increased size of countermovement. 
Let’s discuss results of analysis in details (case 
of Dow-Jones index for the period 1987-2012). We 
choose Dow-Jones index because US stock market is 
the biggest and developed in the world. Plus it has the 
biggest number of participants and the highest level of 
exchange culture in general.  
The number of abnormal returns detections 
during 1987-2012 is presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. The number of abnormal returns detections in Dow-Jones index during 1987-2012 
 
n 5 10 20 30 
Indicator Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Overall 6458 100 6454 100 6444 100 6434 100 
Number of abnormal returns (criterion - 
mean+sigma)   
1297 20 1183 18 1123 17 1070 17 
Number of abnormal returns (criterion - 
mean+2*sigma)   
587 9% 474 7 379 6 371 6 
Number of abnormal returns (criterion - 
mean+3*sigma)   
290 4% 194 3 159 2 145 2 
 
As we can see, both parameters (period of 
averaging and number of standard deviation added to 
mean) make impact on the number of detected 
anomalies. It should be mentioned that change of 
averaging period causes relatively small deviations of 
the number of detected anomalies (difference between 
number for the period=5 and period=30 is less than 
10%). So period of averaging is not so important from 
the position of number of detected anomalies. That is 
why selection of averaging period may be depended 
on other factors that interest researcher.  
Opposite situation is observed for the parameter 
that concerns the number of standard deviations 
should be added to mean to detect the anomaly. 
Each additional standard deviation significantly 
decreases the number of observed abnormal returns 
(the size of decrease is 50% for each additional 
sigma). It creates strong restrictions for the practical 
use of this parameter. 2-4% of overall data sample (the 
number of abnormal returns in case of 3 sigmas) are 
not enough to create a representative population and to 
make reasonable conclusions. 
Based on data from Tables A.1-A.4 we selected 
the next set of parameters: period of averaging = 30, 
the number of sigmas = 1. This selection is caused by 
the following reasons: 
1) Results for different types of market are close 
to each other with this combination of parameters; 
2) Small periods of averaging cause serious 
fluctuations in values of means and standard 
deviations that increases the level of “noise” in data 
and results; 
3) Increased number of sigmas significantly 
reduces the number of detected anomalies; 
4) The quality of results is the highest for this 
set of parameters (difference between normal 
countermovements and countermovements after 
abnormal returns). 
Results of analysis for this set of parameters are 
presented in Table 3. 
The results of empirical tests evidence are in 
favor of the statistically significant difference between 
the size of countermovements after “normal” returns 
and the size of countmovements after abnormal 
returns. The only exception among analyzed types of 
financial markets is foreign exchange market (case of 
EURUSD). In case of FOREX difference between the 
size of countermovements after “normal” returns and 
the size of countermovements after abnormal returns 
is statistically insignificant (means are 0,5 and 0,52 
accordingly). So for the FOREX null hypothesis is 
accepted. These results are consistent with EMH. So it 
is impossible to get extra profits from trading on 
foreign exchange market using the contrarian trading 
strategy based on short-term overreactions. 
For other types of financial markets (stock 
and commodities) difference between means (let’s call 
it “delta”) is nearly 10% and it is statistically 
significant (t-criterion is bigger than t-critical). 
Nevertheless “delta” is different for each type of 
markets and assets. Maximum difference between 
“normal” average and “abnormal” was observed in 
Ukrainian stock market (1.07% vs 1.79%). “Delta” 
exceeds 50%. This gives huge opportunities for 
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speculative transactions based on contrarian trading strategy. 
 
Table 3. Results of null hypothesis testing for different types of financial markets and assets (period of 
averaging=30, number of sigmas=1) 
 
Type of 
financial 
market 
Commodities market Stock market 
Foreign 
exchange 
market 
Type of 
asset 
Gold Oil UX index 
Dow-Jones 
index 
EURUSD 
Indicator abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of 
matches 726 3583 693 3816 142 790 1070 5364 952 5164 
Mean 0,73% 0,66% 1,64% 1,50% 1,79% 1,07% 1,09% 0,92% 0,52% 0,50% 
Standard 
deviation 0,72% 0,71% 1,48% 1,42% 2,11% 1,14% 1,12% 0,77% 0,44% 0,43% 
t-criterion 2,74 2,49 4,10 4,72 1,12 
t-critical 
(р=0.95) 1,96 
Null 
hypothesis rejected rejected rejected rejected accepted 
 
US stock market demonstrates the second biggest 
“delta”. Average size of delta for Dow-Jones index is 
less than 20%. Anyway this difference is statistically 
significant that gives opportunities for successful 
trading on overreaction. 
Thou, stock markets are the most sensitive to 
overreactions and further countermovements among 
other types of financial markets.  
For commodities markets  “delta” equals 10% on 
average and is statistically significant. This let us 
make a conclusion that countermovements after 
“normal” and “abnormal” returns are different. Also 
we should point out that the size of countermovement 
after “abnormal” returns for Oil is the biggest after 
Ukrainian stock market. 
In general, results evidence in favor of less 
efficiency of the Ukrainian stock market (comparing 
with US stock market or other types of financial 
markets) and it’s high speculative potential (size of 
countermovements in Ukrainian stock market is 
almost 2 times bigger than in US stock market).  
These facts allow extra profit obtaining from the 
trading on Ukrainian stock market.  
Based on results of research we can recommend 
the following rules of trading on short-term market 
overreactions: 
1) detection of anomaly (abnormal return) – as a 
criterion can act exceeding of current range of 
fluctuation over certain value (according to our results 
this value is mean with a period of averaging 30 plus 1 
standard deviation); 
2) in case of detection of anomaly the next day 
position opposite to previous abnormal movement 
should be opened; 
3) after reaching the target price (average size of 
countermovement for certain type of asset or market) 
open position should be closed. 
Of course these rules are common and should be 
specified in the process of backtesting of strategy 
based on them.  
 
5 Conclusions 
 
In general results of research on the stock and 
commodities markets are consistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis. Results for FOREX are 
consistent with EMH. The results are rather sensitive 
to the set of parameters of testing. That is why they 
should be interpreted with the reference to the set of 
used parameters.  Nevertheless, results of analysis 
evidence in favor of temporary inefficiencies in 
activities on stock and commodities markets.   
We find significant evidence of overreactions in 
Ukrainian stock market using the daily data over the 
period 2008-2012. Results show that the size of 
contrarian price movements in Ukrainian stock market 
is higher than in US market. Comparing results from 
Ukrainian stock market with other financial markets 
we conclude that there is a high speculative potential 
on the Ukrainian stock market and also that the 
Ukrainian stock market is less efficicient. Low level of 
market efficiency gives opportunities for extra profits.  
Based on results of research we recommend 
some rules of trading on short-term market 
overreactions. Our study also makes some 
contribution to the overreaction hypothesis literature. 
First, we provide evidence of abnormal counter-
reactions after the overreactions on Ukrainian stock 
market. These results are consistent with overreaction 
hypothesis. Second, we find practical implication to 
the overreaction hypothesis on the Ukrainian stock 
market - rules of trading on short-term market 
overreactions. Third, analysis of different financial 
markets with the same methodology let us make 
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complex conclusions about the presence of short-term 
market overreactions in modern financial markets and 
to highlight markets immune or exposed to 
overreactions.  
 
6 Summary 
 
This paper investigates whether counter-movements 
after days with abnormal returns are larger than 
countermovement after “normal” days. 
Our results, based on daily data from US stock 
market, FOREX, commodities and Ukrainian stock 
market, indicate the following:  
Firstly, the behavior of the stocks and 
commodities markets is consistent with the 
overreaction hypothesis and evidence in favor of 
temporary inefficiencies in activities on stock and 
commodities markets. 
Secondly, the results for FOREX are consistent 
with EMH.  
Thirdly, the results are rather sensitive to the set 
of parameters of testing. That is why they should be 
interpreted with the reference to the set of used 
parameters.   
Fourthly the size of contrarian price movements 
in Ukrainian stock market is higher than in the US 
market. Comparing results from Ukrainian stock 
market with other financial markets we come to 
conclusion about the less market efficiency of the 
Ukrainian stock market. Low level of market 
efficiency gives opportunities for extra profits.  
Finally, the important conclusion of this research 
is the high speculative potential of the Ukrainian stock 
market. Results of this paper can be a good base for 
construction a contrarian trading strategy based on 
short-term overreactions analysis. Basics of such 
strategy were proposed in this paper. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1. Test results for Dow Jones Industrial Average Index for the period 1987-2012 
   
 
1 sigma     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 1297 5161 1183 5271 1123 5321 1070 5364 
Mean 0,97% 0,95% 1,00% 0,94% 1,06% 0,93% 1,09% 0,92% 
Standard deviation 0,97% 0,80% 1,01% 0,80% 1,08% 0,78% 1,12% 0,77% 
t-criterion 0,859571855 2,033267584 4,230763317 4,722439164 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted rejected rejected rejected 
         
   2 sigmas     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 587 5871 474 5980 379 6065 371 6063 
Mean 1,01% 0,95% 1,07% 0,94% 1,14% 0,94% 1,20% 0,94% 
Standard deviation 1,14% 0,81% 1,26% 0,80% 1,39% 0,79% 1,41% 0,79% 
t-criterion 1,414756929 2,282117763 2,764405498 3,545822771 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted rejected rejected rejected 
         
   3 sigmas     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 290 6168 194 6260 159 6285 145 6289 
Mean 1,07% 0,95% 1,10% 0,95% 1,29% 0,94% 1,52% 0,94% 
Standard deviation 1,39% 0,81% 1,57% 0,81% 1,84% 0,80% 1,99% 0,79% 
t-criterion 1,477631306 1,384190797 2,367443946 3,482152514 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted rejected rejected 
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Table A.2. Test results for the UX index for the period 2009-2012 
 
   1 sigma     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 180 777 164 788 154 788 142 790 
Mean 1,43% 1,14% 1,54% 1,13% 1,71% 1,08% 1,79% 1,07% 
Standard deviation 1,94% 1,29% 1,95% 1,30% 2,05% 1,23% 2,11% 1,14% 
t-criterion 2,036494236 2,725513425 3,762167756 4,096163334 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis rejected rejected rejected rejected 
         
   2 sigmas     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 73 884 85 867 72 870 66 866 
Mean 1,39% 1,17% 1,67% 1,15% 2,02% 1,12% 2,04% 1,11% 
Standard deviation 1,77% 1,40% 2,22% 1,34% 2,36% 1,29% 2,06% 1,27% 
t-criterion 1,051742909 2,128155584 3,2381263 3,650673714 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted rejected rejected rejected 
         
   3 sigmas     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 31 926 43 909 35 907 27 905 
Mean 1,46% 1,18% 1,41% 1,19% 1,78% 1,17% 2,39% 1,14% 
Standard deviation 1,98% 1,40% 1,91% 1,42% 2,20% 1,37% 2,28% 1,31% 
t-criterion 0,789177573 0,756710393 1,648250598 2,843550605 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted rejected 
 
  
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 1, 2013, Continued - 4 
 
420 
Table A.3. Test results for the currency pair EURUSD for the period 1989-2012 
 
   1 sigma     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 1267 4875 1074 5062 1006 5120 952 5164 
Mean 0,97% 0,95% 0,50% 0,51% 0,50% 0,51% 0,52% 0,50% 
Standard deviation 0,97% 0,80% 0,42% 0,43% 0,43% 0,43% 0,44% 0,43% 
t-criterion 0,849572618 -0,860344841 -0,310513198 1,120110619 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted accepted 
         
   2 sigmas     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 629 5513 454 5682 374 5752 334 5782 
Mean 1,01% 0,95% 0,49% 0,51% 0,52% 0,50% 0,55% 0,50% 
Standard deviation 1,14% 0,81% 0,43% 0,43% 0,43% 0,43% 0,44% 0,43% 
t-criterion 1,464495703 -0,766391672 0,625074255 1,921197517 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted accepted 
         
   3 sigmas     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 355 5787 206 5930 144 5982 126 5990 
Mean 0,97% 0,95% 0,54% 0,50% 0,59% 0,50% 0,64% 0,50% 
Standard deviation 0,97% 0,80% 0,47% 0,43% 0,45% 0,43% 0,47% 0,43% 
t-criterion 0,449703612 1,08240839 2,208156707 3,263013086 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted rejected rejected 
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Table A.4. Test results for gold for the period 1996-2012 
 
   1 sigma     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 886 3448 807 3522 745 3574 726 3583 
Mean 0,65% 0,67% 0,68% 0,67% 0,72% 0,66% 0,73% 0,66% 
Standard deviation 0,64% 0,72% 0,66% 0,72% 0,69% 0,71% 0,72% 0,71% 
t-criterion -1,334982129 0,686034132 2,191599044 2,742147192 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted rejected rejected 
         
   2 sigmas     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 398 3936 315 4014 271 4048 255 4054 
Mean 0,62% 0,67% 0,63% 0,67% 0,68% 0,67% 0,74% 0,67% 
Standard deviation 0,58% 0,72% 0,61% 0,71% 0,70% 0,71% 0,79% 0,70% 
t-criterion -1,815892765 -1,388517607 0,210430638 1,481041542 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted accepted 
         
   3 sigmas     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 189 4145 105 4224 59 4260 55 4254 
Mean 0,54% 0,68% 0,62% 0,67% 0,81% 0,67% 0,87% 0,67% 
Standard deviation 0,51% 0,71% 0,62% 0,71% 0,95% 0,70% 0,97% 0,70% 
t-criterion -3,77366079 -0,849613628 1,184316079 1,515310007 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted accepted 
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Table A.5. Test results for oil for the period 1995-2012 
 
   1 sigma     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 909 3625 776 3753 716 3803 693 3816 
Mean 1,51% 1,52% 1,56% 1,51% 1,59% 1,51% 1,64% 1,50% 
Standard deviation 1,39% 1,44% 1,47% 1,42% 1,46% 1,42% 1,48% 1,42% 
t-criterion -0,100474427 1,027787923 1,593035355 2,493366194 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted accepted rejected 
         
   2 sigmas     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 430 4104 333 4196 260 4259 233 4276 
Mean 1,50% 1,52% 1,58% 1,51% 1,73% 1,51% 1,79% 1,51% 
Standard deviation 1,36% 1,44% 1,47% 1,43% 1,55% 1,42% 1,64% 1,42% 
t-criterion -0,327743331 0,771770513 2,298565501 2,68803689 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted rejected rejected 
         
   3 sigmas     
  5 10 20 30 
  abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal abnormal normal 
Number of matches 208 4326 138 4391 111 4408 107 4402 
Mean 1,52% 1,52% 1,46% 1,52% 1,85% 1,51% 1,93% 1,51% 
Standard deviation 1,19% 1,44% 1,30% 1,43% 1,56% 1,42% 1,57% 1,43% 
t-criterion 0,000530744 -0,525812924 2,258133103 2,725251584 
t-critical (р=0.95) 1,96 
Null hypothesis accepted accepted rejected rejected 
